

Invisible Control, Visible Risk:

Labour Conditions and Regulatory
Pathways in Asia's Platform Economy



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Executive summary

The digital platform economy has rapidly expanded to encompass a wide array of sectors, transforming how work is organised and mediated across the globe. Defined by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as “a ‘digital interface’ or an ‘online service provider’ . . . positioned between the providers of the services or goods and their clients,”ⁱ digital platforms are now embedded in a diverse range of industries, including transport, care services, education, wholesale and retail trade, financial services, household repair, and more.ⁱⁱ As digital intermediation becomes increasingly central to the global economy, platform-based work has emerged as a key source of livelihood for millions.

This report presents new evidence collected in 2025, based on interviews with 1006 workers engaged in platform-mediated work across five countries: Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Nepal, and The Philippines. Together, India, Bangladesh, The Philippines, and Indonesia account for over 46 percent of all workers active on major online labour platforms globally (Figure 1). The inclusion of Nepal enriches this analysis by offering insights from a newer entrant into the platform economy, where labour market norms and digital infrastructure are still taking shape. The workers interviewed are distributed across multiple subsectors, with the majority engaged in delivery and passenger transport, while others work in domestic services, entertainment and recreation, and home maintenance and repair services.




Figure 1: Share of digital platform workers in India, Bangladesh, The Philippines, and Indonesia of all workers on major online platforms globally, top 15 countries worldwideⁱⁱⁱ

This report is structured into seven main sections, covering distinct elements of digital platform work and presenting the following key findings.

Section 1 - Methodology and trends in the Asian digital platform economy presents the methodology and sample for this research, situated in context of the five countries and three sectors of the digital platform economy, including ride sharing, food delivery, and home services. It presents findings on workforce demographics:

- Female workers constituted only 17% of the 1006 study participants, majorly represented in the home services sector. The food delivery and ride sharing sectors remain heavily male dominated.
- Compared to typical education profiles within the informal workforce, platform workers in this study demonstrate relatively higher levels of schooling. Across countries, 62% completed secondary education (Grade 10–12), with a smaller but notable proportion having undertaken undergraduate (24%).
- 31% of workers reported internal migration for work within the last five years. These patterns are consistent with broader research on digital platform work and internal migration in Asia.

Section 2 - Digital Platforms in Asia – Market structure situates research findings in relationship to the structure of the digital platform economy in Asia.

- Workers were engaged through 27 platforms distributed across 11 multinational and regional firms and 16 national platforms.

Section 3 - Transformations in the way work is organised and performed in the digital platform economy lays out the platform revenue models identified within this research.

- Platforms in the study operate primarily on two-sided on-demand models, with many incorporating revenue from premium services and ad-supported monetization.
- 73% of food delivery, 61% of ridesharing and 61% of home service workers reported that their payment was calculated based on tasks. While task-based remuneration is promoted by platforms as offering workers autonomy and flexibility, findings from this study reveal that task-based work produces unpaid availability, volatile earnings, and opaque and unilateral pricing.

Section 4 - Digital performance monitoring and decent work outcomes presents research findings on how platforms monitor worker productivity and the implications of these digital monitoring practices on working conditions.

- 85% of the workers in delivery, 83% in ridesharing, and 64% in home services reported that their performance was monitored through metrics including ratings and number of tasks completed.
- The impacts of ratings on access to work and wages was pronounced across sectors, where 71% of food delivery, 82% of ridesharing, and 59% of home services workers described impacts on earnings, getting gigs, reaching incentives, and avoiding account blockage and termination.

The influence of ratings on access to work and wages relationship is significant because it demonstrates that lead firms exercise significant control over workers through algorithmic performance monitoring systems.

Section 5 - Working Conditions lays out research findings on remuneration, working hours, platform performance metrics, occupational health and safety and workplace violence

- Within sectors and countries, platform workers face extreme income volatility and unpredictable earnings, with earnings varying 100% to 330% in relationship to demand fluctuations and inconsistent incentives.
- Platform workers are engaged for long hours: 64% of food delivery, 74% of ridesharing, and 34% of home services workers described shifts that exceeded 8-hours a day.
- Platform workers also report extremely high occupational health and safety risks, with 97% of food delivery, 94% of ridesharing, and 41% of home service workers reporting road safety risks alone.

Section 6 - Extreme weather impacts on platform workers considers the impact of weather-related impacts on working conditions and wages.

- Across all countries and sectors, excess rains and increasing heat are reported by 71% and 43% of platform workers respectively.
- The most commonly reported impact on workers is delays in service provision —reported by nearly half of food delivery, more than one-third of ridesharing, and one-fourth of home services workers.
- Wage loss was also widely reported with workers mentioning both full-day income losses when platforms were shut down (23%) and losses due to low demand (26%).
- Despite this wage volatility, 83% of the workers reported that they did not receive any support from the government or their employers to mitigate climate-related impacts on their livelihoods.

Section 7 – Social security awareness and access for platform workers addresses both access to social security and employer protections.

- Across countries, flagship schemes by governments have managed to generate significant awareness among platform workers. However, workers report significantly less access to than knowledge of schemes and entitlements. These findings suggest barriers to access that require further analysis in subsequent stages of this study.
- In terms of benefits provided by platforms, health insurance was the most common, reported by 26% of workers overall, followed by life insurance (18%) and accidental insurance (17%). However, across all sectors, 31% of platform workers reported receiving no benefits at all, while a further 22% said they were unaware of any benefits, underscoring both the absence of protections and the lack of transparency in how they are communicated.

This report concludes with a consolidated set of regulatory recommendations, aligned with ILO conventions and designed to support decent work in the platform economy. These include proposals to strengthen employment classification frameworks, regulate algorithmic systems, integrate platform workers into national occupational safety and climate resilience strategies, and advance social protection.

By centring the lived experiences of platform workers in Asia—who comprise nearly half of the global digital labour force—this briefing provides a critical input into global standard-setting efforts. It calls on for bold, evidence-based action to address structural precarity, institutionalise worker protections, and ensure that digital transformation leads to dignified, secure, and equitable work for all.

Section 1

Methodology and trends in the Asian digital platform economy

This brief is based on interviews with 1006 workers engaged in platform-mediated work across Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Nepal, and The Philippines (Table 1). Respondents were drawn from three major segments of the digital platform economy: food delivery, ride sharing, and home services. The sample is designed to capture sectoral variation, gender diversity, and labour mobility, while offering a comparative lens across national contexts with different levels of platform labour integration and regulatory maturity. Accordingly, the findings laid out in this brief provide a robust and credible snapshot of platform labour in Asia’s digital economy. While the sample cannot claim statistical representativeness, its internal coherence and external consistency with documented regional patterns give it strong analytical value.

Platform workers in Asia represent a young, mobile, and increasingly educated segment of the labour force whose lives and livelihoods are shaped by the absence of stable protections. Recognising these trends is critical for policy design: regulation must address not only income security and social protection but also issues of skill utilisation, portability of entitlements for migrants, and safeguards against precarity for educated youth. By grounding regulation in the actual profile of platform workers, states can ensure that the platform economy contributes to decent work rather than reinforcing cycles of informality and exclusion.

Sector and urban labour market selection

Food delivery, ridesharing and home services sectors were selected due to their visibility in urban platform economies and their relevance to the global conversation on informalisation, algorithmic management, and labour rights (Table 1). India and Bangladesh account for large shares of the global platform workforce, Indonesia and The Philippines are included due to their significance in Southeast Asia’s digital economy, and Nepal was selected as a smaller but rapidly growing labour market to capture early-stage dynamics. Within each country, our investigation focused on cities selected for the prominence of digital platform work (Table 2).

Table 1: Distribution of respondents by country and DPE sector¹

Country	Food delivery	Ride sharing	Home services	Total
Bangladesh	76	76	51	203
India	70	80	51	201
Indonesia	79	96	27	202
Nepal	74	76	50	200
The Philippines	62	101	37	200
Total	361	429	216	1006

In each country, a city-based approach was followed to narrow down the geographical scope of the survey. These cities were chosen based on the prevalence of platform work (Table 2)

Table 2: City selection in sample countries

Country	No. of cities chosen	City
Bangladesh	1	Dhaka
India	4	Bengaluru, Delhi NCR, Hyderabad and Mumbai
Indonesia	2	Jakarta and Yogyakarta
Nepal	1	Kathmandu
The Philippines	1	Metro Manila

¹ This report is based upon the quantitative findings first phase of a larger research initiative aimed at documenting labour conditions in the digital platform economy

Socio-demographics

Gender

Across sectors included in this study, gender segmentation among workers is pronounced (Table 3). These patterns are broadly consistent with established research and labour market data from the region, which show that male workers dominate platform-mediated work in transport and logistics, while women are more likely to be engaged through platforms in feminised roles such as domestic work, cleaning, and beauty services.^{iv}

Table 3: Gender segmentation of digital platform workers across sectors and countries

Country	Male	Female	Prefer not to say
Food delivery sector			
Bangladesh	76	0	0
India	69	1	0
Indonesia	65	14	0
Nepal	72	2	0
The Philippines	61	0	1
Food delivery - total	343	17	1
Ride Sharing sector			
Bangladesh	76	0	0
India	80	0	0
Indonesia	88	8	0
Nepal	70	6	0
The Philippines	99	2	0
Ridesharing - total	413	16	0
Home services sector			
Bangladesh	18	33	0
India	24	27	0
Indonesia	13	14	0
Nepal	20	30	0
The Philippines	4	32	1
Home services - total	79	136	1
TOTAL	835	169	2

Age

Across countries and sectors, most platform workers engaged for this study were between 18 and 45 years old (Figure 2). In Bangladesh, India, and Nepal, a high proportion of workers were between 18 and 30 years old. In Indonesia and The Philippines, most workers were between 31 and 45 years old. These numbers indicate that younger people are joining platform work in large numbers, especially in Bangladesh, India, and Nepal.




Figure 2: Age segmentation of digital platform workers by country

Educational attainment

Compared to typical education profiles within the informal workforce, platform workers demonstrate relatively higher levels of schooling. Across countries, the majority had completed secondary education (Grade 10–12), with a smaller but notable proportion having undertaken undergraduate or even postgraduate studies. Although platform work is often framed as low-skilled employment, these findings show that it also draws workers with secondary and higher education. These education levels align with the literacy and digital competencies required for app-based systems and reveal a deeper challenge: educated workers are entering jobs with limited prospects for career progression or skill upgrading, effectively locking them into precarious, low-wage trajectories and reinforcing the broader crisis of graduate underemployment in South and Southeast Asia.^v Regulatory strategies to advance decent work in the digital platform economy could include mandating transparent career progression pathways and supporting skill recognition and upgrading programs.




Figure 3: Education levels of digital platform workers by country

Internal migration

Internal migration is an important lens for understanding platform labour in Asia. Across the five countries studied, 31% of respondents reported migrating within their country for work in the past five years, however, with significant variation by sector and national context (Figure 4). In Nepal, among platform workers, there is a high representation of internal migrants. In India and Indonesia, we observe sector-specific migration, primarily in food delivery for both and ride sharing for India. These patterns reflect the strong role of rural–urban labour mobility in shaping platform workforces. In contrast, Bangladeshi and Filipino platform workers are more likely to be locally rooted, with very low migration or consist of more permanent migrants. Sectoral variation is also clear. Food delivery consistently attracts the highest share of migrant workers across countries, followed by ridesharing, while home services often involve more locally embedded workers—except in Nepal.

These findings suggest that platform work has become an important employment channel for recent migrants, especially in early-stage or rapidly expanding platform markets. Relatively low barriers to entry—basic literacy, smartphone access, and in some cases a vehicle—make platform jobs accessible to migrants even when other opportunities are limited. These findings are consistent with broader research on digital platform work wherein studies have found that platform work often attracts internal migrants in contexts where rural–urban labour flows are strong and formal employment opportunities are limited.^{vi}




Figure 4: Share of digital platforms workers who self-described as internal migrants (moving in the last five years) by country

The significance of these patterns for regulatory protection is considerable. Migrant workers often face compounded vulnerabilities in urban labour markets—limited social networks, exclusion from local welfare entitlements, and higher exposure to exploitation. Regulatory frameworks must therefore account for the intersection of migration and platform work by ensuring portability of social security benefits and extending occupational health and safety protections to mobile and app-based work. Without such targeted measures, platform work may reinforce existing inequalities.



Section 2

Digital Platforms in Asia – Market structure



The platforms represented in this research reflect the diversity of digital labour intermediaries active across the five countries in food delivery, ridesharing, and home services. Workers were engaged through 27 platforms distributed across 11 multinational and regional firms and 16 national platforms. This mix highlights the coexistence of different scales of digital intermediation in Asia's platform economy, each carrying distinct implications for workers and regulation. Together, this landscape underscores that platform labour markets in Asia cannot be understood as monolithic. Instead, workers encounter diverse governance regimes depending on whether they are engaged by global corporations, national firms, or regionally embedded hybrids.




Figure 5: Multinational and regional platforms in study sample

Multinational platforms dominate ride sharing and food delivery in more mature platform economies such as India, Indonesia, and The Philippines. Their operations are characterised by sophisticated algorithmic management systems and regionally standardised terms of engagement. These firms often set the tone for sector-wide labour practices, influencing payment models, onboarding systems, and performance monitoring across markets.

Regional firms occupy a hybrid position, expanding across borders while retaining deep national integration. They compete with both multinationals and local firms, often drawing legitimacy from being simultaneously regionally scaled and locally embedded.

National platforms, by contrast, demonstrate the persistence of locally grounded innovation. The 16 national platforms included in this study play a particularly important role in home services and in emerging platform markets such as Nepal (Table 4). While smaller in scale, they reflect market-specific adaptations: tailoring services to local consumer expectations, experimenting with hybrid remuneration models, and at times offering differentiated conditions for workers.

Table 4: National level platforms across countries

Country	No. of Platform(s)
Bangladesh	3
India	3
Nepal	5
The Philippines	5

The diversity of firm structures in Asia’s platform economy has direct consequences for regulation. Multinational firms set labour practices at scale, establishing norms on pricing, worker classification, and performance management that smaller competitors often adopt to remain viable. Multinational firms also, however, evade accountability by claiming the status of “technology companies” to avoid employer obligations, and by operating through local subsidiaries in each country while the decision-making power (contracts, pricing, algorithms) sits with the global headquarters. National platforms, while more embedded in local contexts, may lack the resources or incentives to provide robust protections.

In this fragmented regulatory environment, the ILO’s ongoing standard-setting process on decent work in the digital platform economy becomes especially critical. It provides a global benchmark that national governments can align with, ensuring coherence across jurisdictions and preventing a “race to the bottom” in labour standards. Anchoring domestic laws in international standards is essential to guarantee that all platform workers—whether engaged by global corporations, regional hybrids, or local startups—have equal access to rights and protections. By bridging the gaps created by multinational strategies and national disparities, international standard-setting offers a credible path toward a fair and consistent regulatory framework for platform labour.



Section 3

Transformations in the way work is organized and performed in the digital platform economy



A. Employment models

Disguised self-employment

While digital platform workers are consistently classified as self-employed or independent contractors, the structure of work reflects significant elements of employer control. This tension—between the legal classification of platform workers and the actual conditions under which they work—is one of the most urgent challenges for labour regulation in the digital economy. Across the 25 digital platforms included in this study, platforms uniformly characterise themselves as technological intermediaries. Worker's report being engaged through standardised adhesion contracts (where contracts exist), often with terms referring to them as “partners,” “service providers,” or “freelancers.” However, the contracts provide little autonomy or negotiation power, and the functional aspects of the relationship are shaped by algorithmic systems and platform management practices.

While formally classified as self-employed, workers are subject to multiple forms of platform-mediated control:

- **Price setting:** Every platform we investigated determines costs of service and worker remuneration unilaterally without giving workers control over rate setting. Twenty-three of twenty-five set the price per task or service, and the remaining two platforms set daily and monthly rates respectively. Platforms also commonly adjust earnings retroactively based on promotions or dynamic pricing mechanisms.
- **Management:** Every platform implements performance management systems—ranging from tracking delivery speed and cancellation rates to customer feedback and rating scores. These metrics are used to filter workers into delivery jobs and to allocate bonuses or penalties. Further, for all platforms, management structures, including supervisors, onboarding trainers, or customer service agents evaluate behaviour and compliance with platform rules. These human interventions exist alongside algorithmic systems and add an additional layer of employment oversight.
- **Mediated payment structures:** Mediated payment structures are universal across platforms. Workers either rely on the platform to disburse earnings, or they submit earnings collected from clients to the platform. In either instance, earnings reflect deductions or adjustments for service fees, penalties, or quality incentives.
- **Compulsory gig acceptance:** In more than half of the platforms, declining a task triggers penalties such as loss of earnings, lower visibility, or deactivation. This system of de facto compulsory gig acceptance contradicts the notion of flexibility that platform work is often presumed to provide.

In short, control over scheduling, pricing, income, and task allocation remains with the platform, not the worker. The use of algorithmic and human management systems further reinforces a dependent relationship, even when formal employment responsibilities—such as contributions to social protection, paid leave, or occupational health and safety—are not provided. These patterns reflect what the International Labour Organization (ILO) defines as disguised or misclassified employment. Under ILO Recommendation No. 198, the existence of an employment relationship must be determined by the reality of the work and remuneration—not by the label used in a contract. The recommendation further affirms that workers are entitled to protection when they operate under the direction, control, or economic dependency of another party, regardless of contractual form.^{vii}

B. Platform revenue models

Platform revenue models shape the economic architecture of digital labour markets and thus play a foundational role in determining how work is structured, compensated, and governed. The platforms represented in this sample operate under a range of revenue models, primarily built on two-sided on-demand services, with varying use of advertising and freemium (or paid premium) subscription options (Table 5). These models shape how workers engage with platforms, how value is generated, and how risk is distributed—all of which carry important implications for regulatory efforts aimed at ensuring decent work.

Across the 25 platforms included in the study, the dominant revenue model is two-sided on-demand intermediation. This is consistent across all food delivery and ride sharing platforms, including multinational firms as well as national firms. Home service platforms also follow this two-sided on-demand logic, monetising the act of intermediation itself. Ad-supported models were also utilised by firms included in this sample. While this model does not directly extract revenue from workers, it introduces a cross-subsidisation dynamic in which visibility, prioritisation, and service access may be shaped by paid marketing, potentially distorting fair access to work or equitable distribution of opportunities across workers. In India, Freemium models are present in the food delivery and home services sectors, and in Indonesia in the food delivery sector, although prevalence is low.

These revenue structures have the following regulatory implications:

1. Employment status and control

The two-sided model allows platforms to position themselves as mere intermediaries rather than employers. However, the integration of algorithmic management, dynamic pricing, and customer ratings systems within this model points to a high degree of functional control, which supports the case for recognising employment relationships and extending labour protections.

2. Income instability and lack of transparency

Freemium and ad-supported models introduce layers of opacity into how earnings are generated and distributed. Workers may not have insight into how subscription fees affect their job assignments, pay rates, or the visibility of their services. Regulation may need to address algorithmic transparency, particularly where differential treatment arises from back-end monetisation systems.

3. Impacts of indirect revenue on the structure of work

Platform diversification into advertising and subscription services complicates labour regulation, especially when revenue is generated from multiple streams that are not tied directly to work performed. While workers are hired as delivery partners, their earnings are limited to commissions for delivery and do not reflect the broader earnings from advertising and subscription services, reinforcing their status as employees.

4. Fair competition among workers

Subscription-based prioritisation, if not transparent and equitably managed, can disadvantage workers who do not have access to “premium” clients or who are excluded from platform-privileged geographies. This effectively creates a tiered labour market where access to higher paying, more frequent jobs is contingent not only on performance but also on the platform’s monetization priorities. Workers who fall outside this preferred group may receive fewer or lower-value job requests, even if they are equally qualified.

Table 5: Platform Revenue Models

Country	Two-sided on demand (No of platforms)	Ad-supported (No of platforms)	Freemium (No of platforms)
	<i>Platforms that act as the intermediary between two parties, with varying degrees of control over the transaction. These platforms create value through per-use fees charged based on the interaction between parties.</i>	<i>A family of platform business models that create value primarily through advertising.</i>	<i>Platforms providing a limited service for free and capturing value through premium subscriptions</i>
Food delivery sector			
Bangladesh	2	1	Nil
India	2	2	2
Indonesia	3	2	1
Nepal	3	Nil	Nil
The Philippines	2	2	Nil
Ride Sharing sector			
Bangladesh	3	1	Nil
India	3	1	Nil
Indonesia	3	2	Nil
Nepal	3	Nil	Nil
The Philippines	4	1	Nil
Home services			
Bangladesh	2	1	Nil
India	1	Nil	1
Indonesia	2	Nil	Nil
Nepal	2	Nil	Nil
The Philippines	2	Nil	Nil

C. Payment models

Task-based payment

The digital platform economy in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Nepal and The Philippines is largely organised around task-based work—a model where workers are paid per service completed, rather than for their time or under a salaried arrangement (Table 6). From a sectoral perspective, food delivery was most consistently organised around task-based payments (73% overall). Ride sharing also displays a strong task-based orientation (61% overall). In home services, overall task-based remuneration remains dominant, but with more variability: India shows near-total dependence on task-based payments (94%), while Nepal remains an outlier with only 22% of home services workers reporting task-based pay. These findings suggest sector-specific segmentation wherein domestic work may retain traces of legacy hourly or daily arrangements, mirroring home-based pay practices for women in home-based services and care work.

Table 6: Task-based payment structure in food delivery, ride sharing and home services

Country	Food delivery	Ride sharing	Home services
Bangladesh	100%	89%	67%
India	90%	80%	94%
Indonesia	76%	69%	48%
Nepal	43%	42%	20%
The Philippines	55%	33%	70%
Total	73%	61%	61%

While task-based remuneration is promoted by platforms as offering workers autonomy and flexibility, findings from this study reveal that task-based work also requires workers to maintain unpaid availability while being subjected to opaque and unilateral pricing, leading to volatile earnings.

- **Extended unpaid availability requirements** are implicit in most platforms because workers must remain online or on-call to access gigs. The separation between work time and paid time undermines the principles of decent work, effectively displacing the risk of underemployment and idle time onto workers themselves. Further, this model obscures employer responsibility, and leaves workers unable to claim protections based on hours worked, even if they spend entire days waiting for tasks.
- **Opaque and unilateral pricing** is the norm, with no worker input into how pay is set.
- **Earning volatility** is tied to demand cycles, algorithmic visibility, and customer behaviour.

Distance-based calculations

Platforms in South and Southeast Asia are also, however, making some inroads in introducing more nuanced pay structures that combine efficiency with at least partial recognition of labour and fuel costs, particularly in food delivery and ridesharing. The emergence of hybrid systems in some sectors and markets reflects a recognition—albeit partial—of the material and temporal costs borne by workers, particularly in congested urban settings where longer trips can erode earnings under flat task-based rates.

Workers reported wages determined by distance-based calculations in India (13%), Indonesia (27%), Nepal (32%), and The Philippines (56%), where platforms combine task and kilometre-based remuneration to reflect the added costs of longer trips across food delivery and ride sharing sectors. Sectorally, this hybrid pay model is particularly visible in ride sharing, where distance is a more natural unit of calculation: 21% of workers overall are paid with respect to kilometres travelled, reaching 65% in The Philippines and 38% in Nepal. India and Indonesia also show a notable share of distance-based pay in ride sharing (18% and 30%, respectively). By contrast, Bangladesh remains almost entirely reliant on per-task models across both sectors, underscoring the absence of adjustments for time or distance. Distance-linked models, while still limited in scale, signal an important shift: they introduce a fairer distribution of risk and operating expenses between platforms and workers, and point to potential pathways for regulatory intervention aimed at standardising more equitable payment structures across the region.

Daily wages

Notably, a small but notable proportion of workers are also engaged on daily wage terms. Overall, daily wage work remains marginal—only 6% of food delivery workers, 3% of ride sharing workers, and 6% of home services workers report being paid this way. The practice is almost entirely absent in Bangladesh and India, suggesting large and mature platform economies may be more firmly anchored in task-based remuneration. By contrast, Nepal shows the highest reliance on daily wage work, with 19% of platform workers overall reporting daily wages—particularly in food delivery (24%), ride sharing (8%) and home services (10%). The Philippines also exhibits some reliance on this model, most visible in home services (14%), though at a much lower scale than Nepal. These patterns suggest that daily wage arrangements emerge in contexts where platforms or workers push for greater income stability, or where local labour markets and regulatory traditions favour wage-based models over purely task-based compensation.





DIRECTION FOR USE
All surfaces should be thoroughly
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material should be removed by wire brushing or
abrasive means.
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brushing after suitable thinning will
the subsequent coat on completion.
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Section 4

Digital performance monitoring and decent work outcomes



Digital labour platforms in South and Southeast Asia rely on algorithmic systems to monitor, evaluate, and control worker behaviour. By embedding monitoring into rating systems, productivity trackers, and time logs, platforms are able to impose discipline and performance benchmarks without legally recognised employment relationships that trigger corresponding labour protections. The variation across countries and sectors shows how these tools are adapted to different market conditions, but the outcome is consistent: the concentration of decision-making power in opaque algorithms that workers cannot contest. This raises critical regulatory questions, particularly around transparency, accountability, and the right to due process—issues now at the centre of ILO debates on algorithmic management and decent work in the digital economy.^{viii}

A. Algorithmic oversight prevalence and mechanisms

Algorithmic management is the central mode of control in platform work across sectors and countries: 68% of workers overall are subject to monitoring through customer ratings, 40% through task completion counts, and 17% through log-in/log-off tracking (Table 7). Only 11% of workers reported not being monitored at all, underscoring the dominance of algorithmic oversight in these labour markets, albeit with sector specific trends in oversight models.

- **Food delivery:** Across the sample 69% cited customer ratings, 23% cited app log-in time, and 50% cited task volume. Overall, the highest rating-related surveillance rates in food delivery were reported in Indonesia (94%), India (87%), and The Philippines (71%).
- **Ride sharing:** Customer ratings were again dominant (74%), time-based monitoring was less common (15%), and task completion tracking remained significant (38%).
- **Home services:** The rating system was especially significant in India (100% of workers), but less so in The Philippines (51%), Bangladesh and Indonesia (59%). Notably, in Nepal the impact of customer ratings was negligible (8%) reflecting distinct customer engagement norms.

Table 7: Overview for platform monitoring or evaluation of workers metrics

Sectors	Customer ratings	Log in - log off time	Tasks completed in a day	Not monitored
Bangladesh				
Food delivery	43%	3%	26%	17%
Ride sharing	66%	1%	26%	24%
Home services	59%	2%	10%	25%
India				
Food delivery	87%	49%	73%	1%
Ride sharing	89%	34%	39%	1%
Home services	100%	45%	55%	0%
Indonesia				
Food delivery	94%	16%	49%	1%
Ride sharing	84%	10%	54%	2%
Home services	59%	4%	11%	22%
Nepal				
Food delivery	50%	22%	62%	3%
Ride sharing	55%	16%	39%	13%
Home services	8%	0%	20%	46%
The Philippines				
Food delivery	71%	29%	39%	2%
Ride sharing	71%	14%	31%	13%
Home services	51%	3%	22%	27%
Combined percentage across all countries and sectors	68%	17%	40%	11%

B. Ratings and employment conditions

Digital ratings are not merely evaluative—they are determinative. Across all sectors, workers reported that ratings influenced key aspects of their working lives, including access to gigs, earnings, incentives, account status, and even termination. On average, nearly half of surveyed workers (49%) said ratings directly determined whether they could access gigs, 35% reported an impact on their earnings, 12% reported an impact on incentives, and 13% said ratings were tied to account suspension and blocking. Only just over a quarter of workers (27%) reported that ratings had no influence at all (Table 8).

Table 8: Overview on ratings influence on the platform work

Sectors	Earnings	Getting gigs	Getting incentives	ID/Account blocked	Termination	No influence of ratings
Bangladesh						
Food delivery	18%	45%	4%	0%	0%	43%
Ride sharing	39%	76%	4%	8%	0%	17%
Home services	37%	45%	2%	2%	0%	27%
India						
Food delivery	19%	64%	19%	21%	13%	24%
Ride sharing	30%	81%	14%	15%	1%	11%
Home services	35%	82%	24%	59%	43%	2%
Indonesia						
Food delivery	63%	14%	18%	10%	11%	9%
Ride sharing	56%	20%	18%	23%	15%	15%
Home services	48%	4%	0%	0%	0%	48%
Nepal						
Food delivery	30%	42%	8%	9%	7%	45%
Ride sharing	54%	79%	5%	20%	12%	16%
Home services	14%	6%	0%	2%	0%	84%
The Philippines						
Food delivery	27%	42%	24%	6%	3%	26%
Ride sharing	26%	54%	20%	12%	11%	31%
Home services	19%	46%	0%	0%	0%	49%
Combined percentage across all countries and sectors	35%	49%	12%	13%	8%	27%

The impact of ratings is most pronounced in ride sharing, where nearly half of workers reported that their ability to access gigs depended directly on their ratings (Table 8). As customer demand is matched in real time through the app, a driver's rating influences not only whether they receive trips but also the frequency and quality of those trips. High-rated drivers are prioritised in the algorithm, while those with lower scores may see their access to rides reduced, leading to sharp fluctuations in daily earnings. Low ratings carry the risk of harsher penalties: in several markets, drivers reported account blocking or even permanent termination when their scores fell below platform thresholds. This dual function—regulating income daily and threatening exclusion in the longer term—makes ratings a uniquely powerful disciplinary tool in ride sharing. It creates constant pressure on drivers to maintain customer satisfaction, even when ratings reflect factors beyond their control such as traffic congestion, platform errors, or customer bias.

In food delivery, ratings also strongly influenced both gig availability and earnings—but unlike in ridesharing, ratings act less as a tool of outright exclusion and more as a mechanism for rationing work and disciplining performance. In food delivery, platforms use ratings to adjust how jobs are distributed, with higher-rated workers given priority access to orders and lower-rated workers pushed to the margins of the queue. This means that poor ratings rarely result in immediate exclusion but instead translate into fewer gigs, lower daily income, and longer waiting times.

In effect, ratings serve as a “soft” disciplinary mechanism: workers remain formally attached to the platform but are gradually denied opportunities, nudging them to either exit voluntarily or improve their performance according to opaque and often arbitrary customer-driven standards. Such rationing reinforces dependency, as workers must continually compete for scarce tasks and maintain high ratings simply to secure a minimum income.

The role of ratings is both most extreme in home services, and highly uneven across countries. In India, ratings played an essential role in determining gig access, account blocking and termination of accounts while in contrast, the influence of ratings in Nepal was minimal with more than 80% of the sample suggesting that ratings had no influence on their work in home services. In Bangladesh, Indonesia, and The Philippines, ratings had a moderate effect. This suggests that in home services, platforms vary widely in how aggressively they deploy ratings as a control mechanism, with India representing the most punitive model.

Taken together, these sectoral patterns reveal how ratings operate as a key mechanism of algorithmic oversight, but in different ways: as a gatekeeping system in ride sharing, as a work distribution tool in food delivery, and as a disciplinary device in home services. In all cases, workers face significant power asymmetries: they are often unaware of how ratings are calculated, how many low scores trigger penalties, or whether they can contest unfair evaluations. Ratings thus embed a form of algorithmic precarity, where workers’ livelihoods hinge on opaque, customer-driven metrics that extend platform control while shielding companies from responsibility as employers.

C. Digital surveillance as a marker of disguised employment

While platforms often claim that workers are free to choose their schedules and act autonomously, the use of algorithmic ratings, performance benchmarks, and availability tracking suggests a level of operational control comparable to traditional employment. Workers described logging into apps early in the morning and staying online late into the evening, afraid to miss job opportunities or risk lowering their metrics. This control is enforced not through employment contracts, but through data-driven management tools that structure incentives, restrict access to work, and sanction non-compliance. As such, digital performance monitoring may function as a proxy for employer control, even where platforms deny formal responsibility. These patterns align with ILO Recommendation No. 198, which affirms that an employment relationship exists when the nature of the work and the control exercised by the other party resemble that of an employer—regardless of how the relationship is contractually described. The extensive use of algorithmic supervision across the platforms studied indicates that digital tools are not neutral; they are integral to maintaining a hierarchical work relationship that is often misclassified.

Section 5

Working conditions



A. Remuneration, volatile earnings, incentives, and onboarding fees

Wages among platform workers show significant variability within sectors and countries, linked to unpredictable task availability, incentive eligibility, and algorithmic job allocation (Table 9).

- **Food delivery** workers earned modest and unstable weekly incomes across all five countries. The cross-country picture indicates that while food delivery can provide a baseline livelihood, incomes are highly dependent on order allocation, incentive eligibility, and city-level demand—factors largely outside workers' control.
- **Ride sharing** was generally the most lucrative sector but also displayed wide variation. Across countries, ride sharing provided higher income ceilings than food delivery, but workers remained exposed to volatility linked to platform commission rates and fluctuating ride demand.
- **Home services** revealed the most income instability across and within countries. The narrow or unstable wage bands in home services reflect the irregular and seasonal nature of demand in home services, combined with weaker integration of these platforms compared to food delivery and ride sharing.

Across all sectors and countries, the evidence points to a structural pattern: platform-mediated work generates wide wage variability even among workers performing the same job in the same city and under the same employer structure. This is not due to performance differences alone, but due to platform-controlled variables such as gig availability, incentive design, algorithmic ranking, and customer demand—none of which are transparent or subject to worker input.

Table 9: Lowest and highest wages received by workers in a week across sectors and countries

Country	Food delivery (local currency)	Food delivery (in USD - purchasing power parity ² (PPP) conversion) ³	Ridesharing	Ridesharing (in USD - purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion)	Home services	Home services (in USD - purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion)
Bangladesh	BDT 2234 to 6686	USD 68 - 203	BDT 3680 to 12216	USD 112 - 370	BDT 2661 to 18094	USD 81 - 548
India	INR 3777 to 9050	USD 190 - 455	INR 5651 to 14603	USD 284-735	INR 4550 to 14549	USD 229-731
Indonesia	IDR 669165 to 1580595	USD 131-310	IDR 904625 to 1754688	USD 177-344	IDR 503704 to 1090741	USD 98 - 214
Nepal	NPR 4091 to 8197	USD 118 - 236	NPR 8474 to 17409	USD 244-502	NPR 4187 to 5966	USD 121 - 172
The Philip-pines	PHP 3879-8364	USD 187 – 405	PHP 5943 to 11627	USD 287-562	PHP 1833-7978	USD 89 - 386

²The purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion factor is a currency conversion factor and a spatial price deflator. They convert different currencies to a common currency and, in the process of conversion, equalize their purchasing power by eliminating the differences in price levels between countries, thereby allowing volume or output comparisons of gross domestic product (GDP) and its expenditure components. This conversion factor is for household final consumption expenditure and the base currency is the US dollar.

³World Bank, "PPP conversion factor, private consumption (LCU per international \$), accessed online October 13, 2025, <https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators/Series/PA.NUS.PRVT.PP?>. Values have been rounded off for readability.

Though some platforms offer financial incentives for working at specific times or completing high volumes of tasks, these incentives do not guarantee income stability (Table 10). Instead of constituting a reliable supplement to wages, platform incentives act as behavioural nudges that push workers to extend their availability, accept more gigs, or work at peak hours. Across the five countries, 35% of workers reported receiving incentives for working at particular hours or shifts, 70% for completing a higher number of tasks, and only 12% for extending working hours.

Table 10: Overview of basis for incentives across sectors and countries

Sectors	Working particular hours or shifts	Completing more tasks	Extending working hours
Bangladesh			
Food delivery	45%	55%	0%
Ride sharing	26%	57%	0%
Home services	15%	35%	4%
India			
Food delivery	62%	83%	6%
Ride sharing	38%	79%	3%
Home services	47%	33%	11%
Indonesia			
Food delivery	10%	92%	11%
Ride sharing	14%	91%	17%
Home services	11%	61%	11%
Nepal			
Food delivery	33%	71%	26%
Ride sharing	44%	70%	21%
Home services	50%	39%	43%
The Philippines			
Food delivery	38%	64%	11%
Ride sharing	32%	76%	8%
Home services	86%	14%	7%
Combined percentage across all countries and sectors	35%	70%	12%

In food delivery, the strongest incentives were tied to completing a higher number of tasks. This was especially pronounced in India (83%) and Indonesia (92%), where workers were encouraged to take on as many orders as possible, regardless of distance or effort. Shift-specific incentives also played a role, with Indian and Bangladeshi workers reporting bonuses for working particular hours or shifts. By contrast, incentives for simply extending working hours were limited across all countries.

In ride sharing, incentives also focused on completing more trips. Over 90% of Indonesian drivers and nearly 80% of Indian drivers said they received bonuses for finishing a high number of rides, showing how platforms link rewards directly to output. Shift-based incentives were somewhat less common but still important in some contexts—for example, 44% of Nepali and 32% of Filipino drivers reported bonuses for driving at certain hours of the day. Incentives for just staying on the road longer were less common, though 21% of Nepali drivers reported extended hour benefits.

In home services, incentive structures were far more uneven. The most striking case was The Philippines, where 86% workers reported receiving bonuses for working particular shifts—suggesting that platforms rely on such schemes to make sure workers are available when demand is uncertain. In Nepal, by contrast, 43% of workers said they were incentivised to extend their working hours, the highest reported across any sector or country. In Bangladesh, Indonesia, and India, relatively few home service workers reported receiving bonuses of any kind.

Adding to this financial instability is the cost of hiring and onboarding fees, reported by nearly half the workers (Table 11). Onboarding costs varied by sector, placing financial pressure on workers before any income was earned. While 51% of workers did not face such charges, the remaining half incurred significant costs before earning their first wage. These fees generally included registration charges, costs for uniforms, bags, or equipment, and in some cases payments for police or government verification.

Table 11: Overview of types of hiring and onboarding costs across sectors and countries

Sectors	Registration/ onboarding	Fee/charges for uniforms, bags, equipment, products for beauty services, etc	Police/ government verification	No fees
Food delivery				
Bangladesh	0%	26%	0%	74%
India	49%	77%	0%	6%
Indonesia	6%	78%	9%	19%
Nepal	7%	43%	16%	31%
The Philippines	3%	48%	32%	48%
Ride Sharing				
Bangladesh	0%	5%	0%	93%
India	16%	1%	0%	80%
Indonesia	3%	48%	18%	44%
Nepal	21%	0%	0%	78%
The Philippines	12%	23%	22%	56%
Home Services				
Bangladesh	16%	4%	0%	76%
India	51%	82%	6%	4%
Indonesia	30%	70%	7%	15%
Nepal	62%	0%	0%	38%
The Philippines	3%	14%	11%	70%
Combined percentage across all countries and sectors	16%	34%	9%	51%

The average costs for hiring and onboarding fees of workers also varied across sectors (Table 12). Food delivery workers faced moderate upfront expenses, ridesharing costs were more uneven while the heaviest burden was in home services, where India stood out with extremely high average onboarding fees of around PPP\$ 1 187, far exceeding other countries.

Table 12: Average hiring and onboarding fees across sectors and countries

Country	Average hiring fees amount in local currency	Average hiring fees amount (PPP\$) ⁴
Food delivery		
Bangladesh	BDT 3260	PPP\$ 99
India	INR 1252	PPP\$ 63
Indonesia	IDR 385703	PPP\$ 76
Nepal	NPR 2074	PPP\$ 60
The Philippines	PHP 2311	PPP\$ 112
Ride sharing		
Bangladesh	BDT 2350	PPP\$ 71
India	INR 1670	PPP\$ 84
Indonesia	IDR 372732	PPP\$ 73
Nepal	NPR 1994	PPP\$ 58
The Philippines	PHP 5940	PPP\$ 287
Home services		
Bangladesh	BDT 6383	PPP\$ 193
India	INR 23600	PPP\$ 1187
Indonesia	IDR 416087	PPP\$ 82
Nepal	NPR 1548	PPP\$ 45
The Philippines	PHP 1220	PPP\$ 59

High levels of income instability make it difficult for workers to plan for basic expenses, repay debts—including those incurred during onboarding, or manage time across multiple platforms. These findings challenge the claim that platform work provides reliable income opportunities and instead point to the need for regulatory interventions that establish predictable earnings floors, transparent pay systems, and enforceable rights to fair compensation.

B. Working hours and unstable schedules

The ILO Convention 1919 (No.1) establishes that working hours should not exceed 8 hours in a day or 48 hours in a week. However most digital platform workers surveyed work longer than the prescribed limits. As shown in Figures 7–9, across food delivery and ridesharing, most workers in all five countries reported working more than eight hours per day. Extended hours do not, however, ensure reliable compensation since for most, payments and targets are pegged to the number of gigs completed rather than hours worked.




Figure 6: Hours workers by platform workers in the food delivery sector across countries




Figure 7: Hours workers by platform workers in the ridesharing sector across countries




Figure 8: Hours workers by platform workers in the home services sector across countries

C. Platform performance metrics

Platforms impose a range of performance metrics that shape how workers engage with their apps. These requirements function as indirect forms of labour control, pressuring workers to adopt patterns of work that mirror employer demands while formally remaining independent contractors. Table 13 illustrates the most common guidelines faced by workers. Across all countries and sectors, the most frequently reported requirement was to avoid cancelling tasks consecutively (38%), followed by completing a designated number of tasks (26%) and working for a certain number of hours (19%). These metrics are enforced through automated monitoring and have direct implications for workers' visibility on the app, earning potential, and risk of suspension.

Table 13: Overview of platform-based guidelines for workers

Sectors	Work for a certain number of hours	Complete a designated number of tasks	Log in and log out every day	Stay active on the app for a certain number of hours	Maintain minimum balance in the account	Not cancelling certain number of gigs consecutively
Bangladesh						
Food delivery	4%	1%	4%	3%	4%	7%
Ride sharing	0%	3%	14%	4%	7%	13%
Home services	4%	6%	8%	0%	4%	0%
India						
Food delivery	16%	29%	13%	10%	3%	50%
Ride sharing	9%	13%	14%	5%	13%	28%
Home services	41%	31%	33%	35%	24%	73%
Indonesia						
Food delivery	23%	43%	15%	15%	8%	82%
Ride sharing	16%	35%	9%	10%	11%	69%
Home services	0%	7%	7%	4%	4%	22%
Nepal						
Food delivery	50%	46%	36%	45%	18%	43%
Ride sharing	21%	34%	9%	16%	43%	47%
Home services	46%	54%	0%	0%	0%	0%
The Philippines						
Food delivery	35%	37%	35%	35%	11%	50%
Ride sharing	9%	30%	24%	30%	13%	39%
Home services	27%	27%	0%	3%	14%	8%
Combined percentage across all countries and sectors	19%	26%	16%	15%	12%	38%

Performance metric priorities, however, varied across sectors and countries:

- **Food delivery:** India and Indonesia, cancellation avoidance was rated exceptionally high (50% and 82% respectively), reflecting platform priority afforded to reliable delivery completion. In addition, Indonesian workers reported significant emphasis on completing a set number of tasks (43%). By contrast, Bangladeshi food delivery workers reported fewer requirements, though a small percentage noted expectations to log in daily and maintain minimum balances.
- **Ride sharing:** Nepal and Indonesia stand out, with drivers frequently required to complete designated tasks (34–35%) and avoid cancellations (47–69%). In The Philippines, ride-sharing workers faced higher expectations to remain active on the app (30%), highlighting algorithmic pressure to stay online even when demand is low.
- **Home services:** Here, the metrics were most stringent in India and Nepal. In India, workers reported the highest incidence of requirements across almost all categories, including completing designated tasks (31%), logging in daily (33%), staying active (35%), and especially avoiding cancellations (73%). Similarly, in Nepal, home service workers cited high expectations to work set hours (46%) or complete tasks (54%). By contrast, Indonesian and Philippines home service workers faced fewer requirements, suggesting lighter but still present algorithmic oversight.

Taken together, these figures demonstrate how performance metrics supplement deactivation risk as mechanisms of control. By obliging workers to stay logged in, complete quotas, or avoid cancellations, platforms reduce genuine flexibility and shift operational risks onto workers. For full-time workers, these demands intensify already long schedules; for part-time workers, they constrain the ability to treat platform work as casual or secondary. In both cases, workers' autonomy is curtailed by rules that closely resemble traditional employer supervision, even while formal employment rights are withheld.

D. Occupational health and safety and workplace violence

The work performed through platforms is physically demanding and often dangerous, exposing workers to a wide range of health and safety risks. Table 14 shows that across all sectors, workers reported facing occupational harms – 90% cited physical risks, 43% psychological harms, and 10% cited direct forms of workplace violence, including discrimination and assault. These risks vary in intensity across sectors but point consistently to the absence of employer responsibility for safe working conditions.

Table 14: Workplace violence faced by platform workers by sector

Sectors	Physical harms	Psychological harms	Discrimination and assault
Definitions	This includes road safety related risks, injuries due to heavy lifting and physical harms associated with other forms of violence during the course of work	This includes instances where workers face mental and psychological harm, including stress and anxiety associated with pressure to meet delivery deadlines/ maintain ratings	This includes reports from worker of having experienced direct forms of workplace violence, including being subjected to physical violence and/ or discrimination.
Food Delivery	97%	57%	11%
Ridesharing	96%	36%	11%
Home services	67%	35%	9%
Combined percentage across all countries and sectors	90%	43%	10%

Food delivery workers reported high exposure to occupational health and safety risks across all countries, with physical harms nearly universal (Figure 10). These findings highlight the inherently hazardous nature of delivery work, from navigating congested roads to exposure to extreme weather and pollution. Alongside these physical dangers, psychological harms were also widespread, though varying by country: workers in Indonesia, Bangladesh, Nepal and India reported stress and anxiety linked to tight delivery deadlines, ratings pressure, and algorithmic monitoring. The Philippines showed a lower but still significant rate (31%), pointing to a substantial minority experiencing mental strain. Direct forms of workplace violence, though less frequently reported, remain a critical concern. Taken together, the figure shows that food delivery work combines universal physical hazards with substantial psychological stress and persistent risks of violence, leaving workers exposed across multiple dimensions of occupational harm.




Figure 9: Occupational health and safety risks faced by food delivery workers across countries

Ridesharing workers, like those in food delivery, reported very high exposure to occupational health and safety risks, with physical harms almost universal. In all the countries, nearly all drivers faced risks linked to long hours behind the wheel, traffic congestion, road accidents, and exposure to pollution. Psychological harms were also widespread, though somewhat less acute than in food delivery. Direct workplace violence was a further risk, with Nepal (25%) standing out for particularly high reports of incidents of physical violence and discrimination. Nonetheless lower numbers under workplace violence still indicate persistent vulnerability.




Figure 10: Occupational health and safety risks faced by ridesharing workers across countries

Home services workers reported lower but still significant levels of workplace violence compared to food delivery and ridesharing, with distinct patterns across countries. Physical harms, while less universal than in transport sectors, remained substantial. Psychological harms were most pronounced in Indonesia (74%), India (55%) and Nepal (40%), where stress stemmed from irregular scheduling, client expectations, and constant pressure to maintain ratings. Direct forms of workplace violence, moreover, remains an important concern for home services workers due to the nature of working in clients' homes, often alone and without oversight. Incidence was highest in India (24%).




Figure 11: Occupational health and safety risks faced by home services workers across countries



Section 6

Extreme weather
impacts on
platform workers



As platform work expands across South and Southeast Asia, workers increasingly find themselves on the frontlines of climate disruption. Unlike traditional employees, digital platform workers receive no formal protections against the rising incidence of extreme weather, even though their work is often mobile, public-facing, and exposed to environmental risk. As laid out in Table 15, survey results show that 81% of platform workers across the five countries reported being impacted by extreme weather events, with exposure particularly high in food delivery (83%) and ride sharing (83%). These figures confirm that extreme weather is a pervasive risk across platform work, cutting across sectors and countries.

Table 15: Digital platform workers impacted by extreme weather events⁵

Country	Yes	No
Food delivery		
Bangladesh	66%	34%
India	79%	21%
Indonesia	90%	10%
Nepal	85%	15%
The Philippines	98%	2%
Total – food delivery	83%	17%
Ride Sharing		
Bangladesh	59%	41%
India	89%	11%
Indonesia	85%	15%
Nepal	82%	18%
The Philippines	95%	5%
Total – ride sharing	83%	17%
Home services		
Bangladesh	69%	31%
India	63%	37%
Indonesia	67%	33%
Nepal	86%	14%
The Philippines	84%	16%
Total – home services	74%	26%
Total	81%	19%

⁵ The percentages in this table include perspectives from the full sample of 1006 workers interviewed in this study. However, Tables 17-18 that follow pertain to a sample size of 816 respondents since follow up questions were only directed to workers who reported extreme weather impacts.

Worker respondents overwhelmingly highlighted three broad categories of disruptive weather events: rainfall and flooding, heat and heatwaves, and cold or storm events (Table 16).

Table 16: Top weather events affecting platform workers across countries

Country	Rank 1	Rank 2	Rank 3
Food delivery			
Bangladesh	Excess rain (64%)	Increasing heat (33%)	Heatwaves (26%)
India	Excess rain (70%)	Increasing heat (44%)	Heatwaves (11%)
Indonesia	Excess rain (68%)	Floods (66%)	Increasing heat (35%)
Nepal	Excess rain (85%)	Increasing heat (68%)	Increasing cold (66%)
The Philippines	Floods (90%)	Excess rain (85%)	Typhoons (82%)
Ride sharing			
Bangladesh	Excess rain (54%)	Heatwaves (32%)	Increasing heat (25%)
India	Excess rain (74%)	Increasing heat (49%)	Heatwaves (16%)
Indonesia	Excess rain (78%)	Floods (68%)	Increasing heat (39%)
Nepal	Excess rain (76%)	Increasing heat (63%)	Increasing cold (58%)
The Philippines	Floods (84%)	Excess rain (83%)	Typhoons (74%)
Home services			
Bangladesh	Excess rain (61%)	Heatwaves (31%)	Increasing heat (27%)
India	Excess rain (61%)	Increasing heat (31%)	Heatwaves (14%)
Indonesia	Excess rain (52%)	Floods (33%)	Increasing heat (26%)
Nepal	Excess rain (72%)	Increasing cold (48%)	Increasing heat (40%)
The Philippines	Typhoons (84%)	Floods (76%)	Excess rain (54%)

- **Excess rainfall and flooding** were the most widely reported disruptions. Excess rain ranked first in nearly every country, creating significant disruptions for platform workers across sectors. Flooding was especially significant in The Philippines and Indonesia. Typhoons further compounded risks for Filipino workers across all three sectors.
- **Increasing heat and heatwaves** were the second major category of concern for workers across sectors, factoring in the top three most impactful weather events in every country with the exception of The Philippines. However, even in The Philippines, increasing heat impacts were significant in the food delivery and ridesharing sectors, with 60% and 52% of workers respectively reporting challenges associated with excessive heat.
- **Increasing cold weather** was less common but still highly significant in Nepal, where 66% of food delivery workers and 58% of ride-sharing workers reported increasing cold among the top three risks. This reflects unique vulnerabilities to seasonal extremes in colder climates.

Extreme weather events generate multiple overlapping economic and operational risks for platform workers: lost income from fewer orders or full-day shutdowns, increased costs through platform deductions, physical damage to vehicles or tools, and delays that further reduce earnings (Table 17). These impacts occur despite workers having little control over the conditions, underscoring their vulnerability to climate-related disruptions.

Table 17: Top work impacts due to weather events across countries and sectors

Country	Wage loss (loss of workday) operational or function due to extreme weather condition	Wage loss due to low orders/ rides/ bookings	Increased platform fee/rates, as app deducts more commission due to slower delivery, etc	Increased ride/order/ booking prices	Delay in service provision by worker (due to weather events)	Damage to delivery item/ vehicle/ tools	Wage loss (couldn't step out of the house due to bad weather)
Food Delivery							
Bangladesh	34%	22%	0%	0%	52%	34%	34%
India	24%	22%	22%	7%	56%	51%	5%
Indonesia	18%	25%	8%	11%	20%	51%	37%
Nepal	32%	19%	19%	13%	92%	60%	17%
The Philippines	25%	38%	30%	10%	28%	46%	21%
Food delivery - Total	26%	25%	16%	9%	49%	49%	23%
Ride sharing							
Bangladesh	42%	42%	11%	7%	31%	18%	40%
India	15%	39%	27%	6%	48%	49%	8%
Indonesia	16%	27%	5%	5%	22%	50%	30%
Nepal	47%	39%	21%	0%	81%	24%	26%
The Philippines	21%	35%	17%	3%	19%	26%	17%
Ride Sharing - Total	26%	36%	16%	4%	38%	35%	23%
Home Services							
Bangladesh	9%	6%	0%	0%	51%	6%	29%
India	34%	28%	6%	3%	66%	47%	13%
Indonesia	11%	33%	11%	6%	50%	11%	67%
Nepal	19%	2%	0%	0%	51%	0%	14%
The Philippines	32%	16%	3%	0%	6%	0%	74%
Home services- Total	21%	14%	3%	1%	45%	12%	35%
Total	25%	28%	13%	5%	43%	36%	25%


The most common impact was delayed service provision, reported by nearly half of food delivery and home services workers and more than one-third of ridesharing workers. In Nepal, delays were particularly widespread, with 92% of food delivery and 81% of ride-sharing workers affected. Wage loss was also widely reported with workers mentioning both full-day income losses when platforms were shut down and losses due to low demand. Additional losses occurred when workers could not leave home during extreme weather or faced damage to their assets such as equipment or vehicles as a result of weather disruptions. Some workers faced higher platform deductions during weather events, with reports that platforms increased commission rates or fees even when deliveries were slowed. Finally, price increases were reported by smaller groups of workers (5% overall), most frequently in food delivery, where workers observed higher booking or ride prices during adverse conditions.

A vast majority of workers reported receiving no assistance from platforms during weather events regardless of the impacts they faced during their work (Table 18). Across all sectors, 80% of workers indicated they were left without any form of support, with this figure rising to 90% in ridesharing and 84% in home services. Where assistance was provided, it was limited and inconsistent. Only 1% of workers overall reported receiving direct compensation or emergency relief, and just 2% reported receiving work incentives from platforms. No workers across any sector reported access to skilling courses or life insurance—either from platforms or 3PLs. These results underline that despite widespread income and safety risks linked to extreme weather, institutional protections and employer-provided support are virtually absent in the platform economy.

Table 18: Types of assistance received by workers during weather events by employers

Sectors	Compensation/ support/ emergency relief from platform/ company operational or function due to extreme weather condition	Work incentives from platform companies	Access to a skilling course from the digital platform company	Life insurance benefits provided by the digital platform company	Life insurance benefits provided by the third-party contractor	No assistance received
Food delivery	1%	3%	0%	0%	0%	75%
Ridesharing	1%	1%	0%	0%	0%	90%
Home services	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	84%
Combined percentage across all countries and sectors	1%	2%	0%	0%	0%	83%





Section 7

Social security awareness and access for platform workers

A. Access to social security

For the most part, tailor-made social security schemes for digital platform workers have not been a government priority. However, due to significant growth in the sector, conversations around draft bills and their formulations are gradually emerging. For example, in India, states such as Karnataka, Telangana and others are working towards policies to protect digital platform workers.

In addition to surveying platform-specific social protection schemes, this research sought to understand worker awareness and access to priority schemes more generally designed for vulnerable communities in each country. Notably, awareness on social security schemes (Table 19) was generally high across all the countries. Flagship schemes by governments managed to generate significant awareness such as the public distribution system in India, PhilHealth in The Philippines and BPJS for health and employment in Indonesia. This evidence suggests that lack/limited awareness was not a barrier for access to platform workers.

Table 19: Schemes awareness by digital platform workers by country⁶

Country	Food security	Health	Education	Livelihood	Housing related	Pension	Financial security	Not aware of any of these schemes
Bangladesh	2%	22%	60%	27%	NA	5%	82%	17%
India	90%	54%	22%	22%	28%	22%	4%	4%
Indonesia	NA	90%	24%	88%	27%	NA	66%	6%
Nepal	51%	83%	NA	82%	17%	89%	84%	11%
The Philippines	NA	97%	NA	49%	90%	92%	69%	1%
Total	29%	69%	24%	53%	32%	41%	61%	8%

However, when compared to reports on awareness, worker reports of access to these schemes showed a drastic decline of more than half across most schemes (Table 20). Despite this decline, with the exception of Bangladesh and The Philippines, more than 50% of digital platform workers were receiving or had received access to at least one scheme in each country. Whether this translates into improved conditions requires further exploration in subsequent stages of this study.

Table 20: Scheme access by digital platform workers by country

Country	Food security	Health	Education	Livelihood	Housing related	Pension	Financial security	Not received benefits on any of these schemes
Bangladesh	0%	0%	2%	2%	NA	0%	4%	72%
India	65%	17%	5%	4%	4%	4%	2%	25%
Indonesia	NA	64%	4%	22%	0%	NA	22%	22%
Nepal	7%	55%	NA	24%	1%	37%	14%	14%
The Philippines	NA	13%	NA	18%	8%	9%	3%	64%
Total	15%	30%	3%	14%	2%	10%	9%	40%

⁶ NA has been included for certain types of schemes because either if they existed in the country they weren't explored in this survey or they were non-existent in the country.

B. Access to employer protection

Access to employer-provided protections among digital platform workers remains extremely limited, with large shares of workers either receiving no benefits or being unaware of any entitlements (Table 21). Across all sectors, 31% reported receiving no benefits at all, while a further 21% said they were unaware of any benefits, underscoring both the absence of protections and the lack of transparency in how they are communicated. Among the benefits that are provided, health insurance was the most common, reported by 26% of workers overall, followed by life insurance (18%) and accidental insurance (16%). Access to paid leave was almost non-existent, with only 1% of workers overall reporting access.

Table 21: Employment protection benefits received by digital platform workers from platforms

Country	Health insurance	Life insurance	Accidental insurance	Paid leaves	Worker wasn't aware of any benefits	No benefits
Food Delivery						
Bangladesh	0%	0%	0%	0%	50%	49%
India	57%	11%	27%	0%	14%	4%
Indonesia	49%	44%	13%	0%	10%	15%
Nepal	19%	12%	43%	0%	15%	8%
The Philippines	35%	26%	21%	0%	15%	29%
Total – Food delivery	32%	19%	20%	0%	21%	21%
Ride Sharing						
Bangladesh	0%	1%	0%	0%	54%	43%
India	14%	0%	3%	0%	36%	46%
Indonesia	44%	41%	16%	0%	5%	30%
Nepal	4%	8%	34%	0%	25%	32%
The Philippines	39%	58%	22%	0%	12%	9%
Total – Ride Sharing	22%	24%	15%	0%	25%	31%
Home services						
Bangladesh	2%	2%	0%	4%	41%	51%
India	73%	14%	37%	10%	6%	2%
Indonesia	19%	11%	4%	0%	4%	74%
Nepal	14%	4%	24%	12%	16%	48%
The Philippines	0%	0%	0%	0%	5%	95%
Total – Home services	23%	6%	15%	6%	16%	49%
Total	26%	18%	17%	1%	22%	31%

Sectoral variation was evident:

- **Food delivery:** 32% of workers reported health insurance, 19% life insurance, and 20% accidental insurance, with no paid leave at all.
- **Ride sharing:** 22% reported health insurance, 24% life insurance, and 15% accidental insurance, while 31% received no benefits.
- **Home services:** 23% reported health insurance and 15% accidental insurance, nearly half (49%) received no benefits at all—the highest among the three sectors.

Country-level differences were also significant. India stood out in home services, with 73% reporting health insurance and 37% accidental insurance, while in stark contrast, 95% of home service workers in The Philippines reported no benefits at all. Similarly, while 58% of ride-sharing workers in The Philippines had life insurance, nearly half of ride-sharing workers in India (46%) reported receiving no benefits.

Overall, the data indicates that while some workers—particularly in certain countries and sectors—do receive limited forms of insurance, coverage is either inconsistent due to limited awareness or absent for the majority. Crucially, benefits such as paid leave remain almost entirely unavailable, highlighting the precarious employment conditions of platform work.



Recommendations:

Advancing Decent Work in the Platform Economy

Transformations in the way work is organised and performed in the digital platform economy

A. Employment models

Platform workers are widely classified as independent contractors despite operating under conditions of economic dependency and managerial control. This study found that in over two-thirds of platforms, human supervisors, onboarding agents, or customer service personnel exercised direct oversight alongside algorithmic systems. ILO Recommendation No. 198 provides that employment status must be based on the real nature of the working relationship, regardless of contract terms.

Recommendations:



- Apply ILO Recommendation No. 198 to classify employment where platforms control work conditions, irrespective of formal labels. In line with the Directive on Platform Work introduced by the European Union in 2024, adopt the rebuttable presumption of an employment relationship when facts indicating control and direction are present.
- Guarantee freedom of association and collective bargaining rights for all platform workers (ILO Conventions Nos. 87 and 98).

Nepal's Legal Framework Recognising Informal Workers as a Pathway to Gig Worker Rights

[Nepal's 2017 Labour Act](#) explicitly recognizes informal and self-employed workers, extending them protections traditionally limited to formal employment. While not yet tailored specifically to digital platforms, this inclusive approach provides a legal foundation for incorporating gig workers into national labour and social protection schemes. Delivery riders in Kathmandu have begun mobilising around these provisions to demand rights to fair contracts, accident insurance, and collective bargaining. By embedding recognition of informality into its labour code, Nepal offers a pathway for ensuring that platform workers are not excluded from labour rights frameworks—a critical precedent for other countries grappling with the blurred boundaries of digital work.

B. Platform revenue models

The monetisation strategies of digital platforms—via transactional fees, subscriptions, and advertising—directly shape job access, pay, and employment dynamics. These strategies often create opaque hierarchies among workers and reduce transparency in earnings.

Recommendations:



- Recognise monetisation structures as relevant to determining employer obligations under ILO Recommendation No. 198.
- Mandate transparency in algorithmic systems tied to commercial models, such as subscription status or promotional prioritisation.
- Prohibit undisclosed algorithmic segmentation based on non-labour commercial criteria.
- Require fiscal contributions to local taxation bases based on total platform revenue, not just task-based income (ILO Convention No. 102 on social security).

C. Task-based work

Although platforms frame task-based work as flexible, it obscures unpaid waiting time, income volatility, and employer control over pay and scheduling. These conditions challenge the standards of decent work.

Recommendations:



- Recognise task-based systems as potential disguised employment under ILO Recommendation No. 198.
- Guarantee minimum earnings and compensation for total working time, including wait periods and platform-directed availability (ILO Convention No. 1).
- Require transparency in pricing algorithms and criteria that affect pay.
- Ensure the right to organise and bargain collectively for rate-setting and work conditions (ILO Conventions Nos. 87 and 98).

Digital Performance Monitoring and Algorithmic Management

Digital surveillance tools such as customer ratings, task metrics, and availability tracking function as de facto mechanisms of employer control. These systems influence pay, access to work, and risk of deactivation, but operate without due process or transparency.

Recommendations:



- Mandate transparency around rating systems, performance benchmarks, and penalties (ILO Convention No. 158 on termination).
- Prohibit sanctions based on opaque or unverifiable metrics, including unmoderated customer reviews. In line with the Directive on Platform Work introduced by the European Union in 2024, mandate that platforms disclose key automated management practices (including rating, deactivation, task allocation, and performance metrics) and provide mechanisms to contest automated adverse decisions, with the option of a human review.
- Require platforms to provide workers with access to their own work histories, ratings, and earnings records in standardized, portable formats to enable portability across platforms and support collective bargaining.
- Ensure worker data protection and restrict invasive monitoring during non-working hours (ILO Convention No. 190 on violence and harassment).

Working Conditions

Platform workers experience unstable earnings, long hours, and heightened occupational risks. Algorithms dictate work opportunities and penalties without transparency or recourse. These realities contravene international norms on fair pay, safe work, and non-discrimination.

Recommendations:



- Extend labour law protections to digital platform workers.
- Establish minimum earnings and wage transparency systems (ILO Convention No. 95).
- Define working time to include app availability and regulate excessive work hours (ILO Convention No. 1).
- Ensure due process, especially in algorithmic deactivation, including notice and the right to appeal (ILO Convention No. 158). Mandate grievance redressal and complaint mechanisms to facilitate reporting and resolution.
- Enforce OSH standards, with mandatory training, insurance, and risk mitigation (ILO Convention No. 155). Set up rest stations for digital platform workers to provide a dignified space to rest, recharge phones, and access clean water and restrooms.
- Implement robust protections against workplace violence and harassment, particularly for women in home services (ILO Convention No. 190).
- Establish tripartite regulatory bodies that include worker representatives in decision-making on platform governance.
- Link platform licensing/registration to compliance with labour and social security obligations.

Malaysia's 2025 Independent Tribunal for Digital Platform Workers

In 2025, [Malaysia mandated the creation of an independent tribunal dedicated to resolving disputes between digital platform workers and companies](#). The tribunal is designed to provide fast, low-cost, and accessible redressal, reducing barriers that workers often face in formal courts. It is empowered not only to hear complaints but also to impose penalties on platforms that fail to comply with labour obligations or tribunal rulings. By institutionalising a specialised ombudsman-cum-tribunal, Malaysia strengthens enforcement of labour protections in the digital economy and ensures accountability of platforms operating in its jurisdiction. This initiative offers a model for other countries seeking to guarantee timely, affordable, and enforceable remedies for platform workers, complementing broader efforts to align national frameworks with emerging ILO standards.

The Philippines' DOLE OSH Guidelines for Delivery Riders (2021)

[The Philippines' Department of Labor and Employment \(DOLE\) issued Occupational Safety and Health \(OSH\) guidelines in 2021](#) to address risks faced by app-based delivery riders. The guidelines require platforms to provide riders with personal protective equipment, ensure safe working conditions, and establish accident reporting and compensation mechanisms. While enforcement remains a challenge, the issuance of sector-specific OSH standards represents institutional recognition that digital labour platforms carry employer-like responsibilities for worker safety. By formally extending OSH obligations to gig work, The Philippines advances a precedent for integrating platform workers into national workplace safety regimes. This regulatory approach underscores how targeted guidelines can serve as stepping-stones toward broader labour protections in the platform economy.

Extreme weather impacts on platform workers

Platform workers—especially in transport and delivery—face acute exposure to extreme weather, pollution, and climate-driven income loss. These risks are exacerbated by a lack of institutional protection, emergency compensation, or insurance coverage.

Recommendations:



- Recognise climate exposure as an occupational hazard requiring preventive measures and adaptation planning (ILO Convention No. 155).
- Require emergency earnings guarantees and app-based wage protection during extreme weather shutdowns. These should replace incentive structures for workers during extreme weather conditions that increase safety risks by driving work under dangerous conditions.
- Provide protective gear, insurance, and sector-specific OSH policies for mobile workers.
- Offer climate training, emergency alerts, and safety planning tailored to local weather risks.
- Formally include platform workers in national disaster relief and social protection frameworks (ILO Convention No. 102).
- Introduce parametric insurance schemes for platform workers to ensure rapid, automatic income support during extreme weather disruptions.

India's NDMA Advisory on Heat Protection for Platform Workers (2025)

India's [National Disaster Management Authority \(NDMA\)](#) has issued an advisory calling on states and companies to safeguard workers from extreme heat. The advisory recommends that platform workers be granted emergency leave during peak summer heatwaves without facing penalties or loss of income. It further directs platforms to equip workers with protective kits, ensure access to shaded rest areas, and establish hydration protocols to prevent heat-related illnesses. By adapting disaster risk management frameworks to platform work, the NDMA provides a blueprint for integrating occupational safety into the governance of digital labour. This initiative highlights how climate resilience and worker protection can be linked, offering a scalable model for other heat-affected economies to follow.

Parametric Insurance for Platform Workers During Extreme Weather Events

Parametric insurance offers an innovative mechanism to protect platform workers whose incomes are highly vulnerable to extreme weather events such as floods, cyclones or heatwaves. Unlike traditional insurance that requires proof of individual loss, parametric products trigger automatic payouts when pre-defined thresholds—such as rainfall levels, temperature spikes, or storm intensity—are exceeded. For gig and platform workers, this means rapid, low-friction compensation during extreme weather events that disrupt their ability to work or lead to wage loss. [Pilot schemes](#) in climate-exposed sectors demonstrate how this can support informal workers during periods of distress and wage loss. Such products for platform workers should consider partnerships between governments and platform companies to provide wage support to workers at subsidised rates. They can be bundled with platform operations or worker welfare funds to extend financial security at scale. By combining climate data with digital payment systems, parametric insurance can ensure timely relief, reduce livelihood risks, and complement broader strategies for climate resilience and universal social protection. This approach is especially relevant for countries in Asia facing escalating climate risks.

Social security

Digital platform workers have limited access to social security schemes which can support them when faced with significant shocks – external and internal.

Recommendations:



- Legislate baseline and portable social protection for platform workers including accident insurance, health insurance, and pensions.
- Design and implement social security schemes specific to the needs of digital platform workers, including the livelihood impacts of climate shocks.
- Design Social Protection Policy Labs and Pilots: Create dedicated spaces—such as policy labs or regulatory sandboxes—where governments, worker organisations, and platforms can jointly design and test models for social protection. Pilots allow stakeholders to experiment with feasible mechanisms for coverage (e.g., insurance mandates, contribution-sharing schemes) and generate evidence to inform scale-up.

Karnataka's 2025 law marks one of the first state-led efforts in India to guarantee social security for gig workers through a shared welfare fund model

Karnataka became the first Indian state to legislate social security for gig workers when it passed the [Platform-Based Gig Workers \(Social Security & Welfare\) Bill](#) in August 2025, following an interim ordinance issued in May 2025. The law creates a Gig Workers Welfare Fund, financed through a 1–5% welfare fee on aggregator payouts alongside worker contributions and government grants, to deliver social protection benefits. A newly established Welfare Board registers workers, issues them unique digital IDs, and ensures portability of benefits across platforms. By embedding rights to fair contracts, transparent payments, and access to grievance redressal, the law anchors gig work within the framework of labour rights and universal social security. Karnataka's initiative provides a replicable model for extending social security to digital platform workers across Asia while aligning with ongoing ILO standard-setting efforts.

END NOTES

ⁱ OECD, ILO and Eurostat, Handbook on Measuring Digital Platform Employment and Work, 2023, 40.

ⁱⁱ See e.g. ILO, Realizing decent work in the platform economy, Geneva: International Labour Office, 2024.

ⁱⁱⁱ Source: ILO, Realizing decent work in the platform economy, Geneva: International Labour Office, 2024, p. 19 (citing Online Labour Observatory, “The Online Labour Index 2020: Online Labour Supply”, accessed on 31 August 2023).

^{iv} ILO, Realizing decent work in the platform economy, Geneva: International Labour Office, 2025, p. 26.

^v See e.g., ILO and ADB, Tackling the COVID-19 youth employment crisis in Asia and the Pacific, International Labour Organization, Bangkok (Thailand), and Asian Development Bank, Manila (The Philippines), 2020, <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/626046/covid-19-youth-employment-crisis-asia-pacific.pdf>.

^{vi} See e.g. Anwar, M. A., & Graham, M. (2021). Between a rock and a hard place: Freedom, flexibility, precarity and vulnerability in the gig economy in Africa. *Competition & Change*, 25(2), 237–258. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1024529420914473> (citing research from South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana and Uganda).

^{vii} ILO, Employment Relationship Recommendation, 2006 (No. 198), Geneva: International Labour Organization, https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312535.

^{viii} Silliman Bhattacharjee, S. and Shivakumar, N. (2025), “The ILO Debate on Algorithmic Management Will Define Worker Rights in the Digital Economy,” Tech Policy Press, September 3, 2025, <https://www.techpolicy.press/the-ilo-debate-on-algorithmic-management-will-define-worker-rights-in-the-digital-economy/>.

Appendix

Socio-demographic data

- Age

Table A: Age of digital platform workers

Country	> 18 years	18 to 30 years	31 to 45 years	46 to 59 years	60 years and above
Food delivery					
Bangladesh	0%	79%	20%	1%	0%
India	0%	74%	23%	3%	0%
Indonesia	0%	18%	68%	14%	0%
Nepal	0%	89%	9%	1%	0%
The Philippines	0%	45%	47%	8%	0%
Food delivery - total	0%	61%	34%	6%	0%
Ride Sharing					
Bangladesh	0%	21%	68%	9%	1%
India	0%	45%	41%	14%	0%
Indonesia	0%	23%	60%	16%	1%
Nepal	0%	45%	46%	8%	1%
The Philippines	0%	27%	59%	14%	0%
Ridesharing - total	0%	31%	55%	12%	1%
Home services					
Bangladesh	2%	55%	41%	2%	0%
India	0%	55%	41%	4%	0%
Indonesia	0%	4%	70%	26%	0%
Nepal	0%	46%	54%	0%	0%
The Philippines	0%	8%	68%	24%	0%
Home services - total	0%	38%	52%	9%	0%
TOTAL	0%	44%	47%	9%	0%

- Education levels

Table B: Education levels of digital platform workers

Country	No formal education	Primary education (Grade 1 to 5)	Middle school education (Grade 6 to 9)	Senior school education (Grade 10 to 12)	Under graduate	Post graduate	Diploma	Vocational course
Food Delivery								
Bangladesh	0%	7%	7%	70%	8%	9%	0%	0%
India	0%	7%	7%	61%	19%	0%	6%	0%
Indonesia	0%	0%	8%	85%	5%	3%	0%	0%
Nepal	0%	0%	8%	88%	4%	0%	0%	0%
The Philip-pines	0%	0%	8%	65%	21%	0%	0%	6%
Food delivery - total	0%	3%	7%	74%	11%	2%	1%	1%
Ride sharing								
Bangladesh	7%	22%	24%	38%	9%	0%	0%	0%
India	6%	5%	10%	53%	21%	1%	3%	1%
Indonesia	0%	0%	8%	80%	10%	1%	0%	0%
Nepal	0%	12%	28%	50%	9%	0%	0%	1%
The Philip-pines	0%	0%	5%	58%	33%	0%	0%	4%
Ridesharing - total	2%	7%	14%	57%	17%	0%	0%	1%
Home services								
Bangladesh	2%	29%	31%	18%	14%	2%	4%	0%
India	0%	4%	22%	49%	25%	0%	0%	0%
Indonesia	0%	0%	33%	59%	7%	0%	0%	0%
Nepal	12%	16%	20%	50%	2%	0%	0%	0%
The Philip-pines	0%	3%	0%	70%	8%	0%	0%	19%
Home services - total	3%	12%	21%	47%	12%	0%	1%	3%
TOTAL	2%	7%	13%	61%	14%	1%	1%	2%

- **Migration status**

Table C: Migration status of digital platform workers within the last 5 years

Country	Yes	No
Food Delivery		
Bangladesh	12%	88%
India	31%	69%
Indonesia	19%	81%
Nepal	99%	1%
The Philippines	2%	98%
Food delivery - total	33%	67%
Ride sharing		
Bangladesh	5%	95%
India	43%	58%
Indonesia	6%	94%
Nepal	89%	11%
The Philippines	7%	93%
Ridesharing - total	28%	72%
Home services		
Bangladesh	6%	94%
India	31%	69%
Indonesia	19%	81%
Nepal	94%	6%
The Philippines	3%	97%
Home services - total	33%	67%
TOTAL	31%	69%

Transformations in the way work is organized and performed in the digital platform economy

- **Task-based work**

Table D: Payment calculation terms by platform

Country	Payment calculated per task	Payment calculated on hourly basis	Payment calculated on daily basis	Payment calculated with respect to kilometres covered	Minimum amount based on contract	Others	Payment calculated on monthly basis
Food Delivery							
Bangladesh	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
India	90%	1%	0%	9%	0%	0%	0%
Indonesia	76%	0%	1%	23%	0%	0%	0%
Nepal	43%	0%	24%	26%	7%	0%	0%
The Philippines	55%	0%	3%	40%	2%	0%	0%
Food delivery - total	73%	0%	6%	19%	2%	0%	0%
Ride sharing							
Bangladesh	89%	0%	0%	11%	0%	1%	0%
India	80%	3%	0%	18%	0%	0%	0%
Indonesia	69%	0%	0%	30%	1%	0%	0%
Nepal	42%	0%	20%	38%	0%	0%	0%
The Philippines	33%	1%	0%	65%	1%	0%	0%
Ride sharing - total	61%	1%	3%	34%	0%	0%	0%
Home services							
Bangladesh	67%	22%	0%	0%	8%	2%	2%
India	94%	2%	4%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Indonesia	48%	44%	0%	0%	0%	7%	0%
Nepal	20%	6%	10%	0%	16%	18%	30%
The Philippines	70%	14%	14%	0%	0%	3%	0%
Home services - total	61%	15%	6%	0%	6%	6%	7%
TOTAL	66%	4%	5%	21%	2%	1%	2%

Digital performance monitoring and decent work outcomes

- Algorithmic oversight prevalence and mechanisms

Table E: Overview of platform monitoring or evaluation of workers metrics

Country	Customer ratings and reviews	Log in/log off time on app	Number of tasks completed in a day	Other	Not monitored	I don't know
Food Delivery						
Bangladesh	43%	3%	26%	11%	17%	21%
India	87%	49%	73%	6%	1%	0%
Indonesia	94%	16%	49%	0%	1%	1%
Nepal	50%	22%	62%	3%	3%	19%
The Philippines	71%	29%	39%	0%	2%	6%
Food delivery - total	69%	23%	50%	4%	5%	10%
Ride sharing						
Bangladesh	66%	1%	26%	4%	24%	7%
India	89%	34%	39%	0%	1%	3%
Indonesia	84%	10%	54%	0%	2%	4%
Nepal	55%	16%	39%	0%	13%	18%
The Philippines	71%	14%	31%	2%	13%	6%
Ride sharing - total	74%	15%	38%	1%	10%	7%
Home services						
Bangladesh	59%	2%	10%	2%	25%	12%
India	100%	45%	55%	12%	0%	0%
Indonesia	59%	4%	11%	4%	22%	7%
Nepal	8%	0%	20%	4%	46%	26%
The Philippines	51%	3%	22%	0%	27%	14%
Home services - total	56%	12%	25%	5%	24%	12%
TOTAL	68%	17%	40%	3%	11%	9%

- **Ratings as determinants of employment conditions**

Table F: Overview on the influence of ratings on platform workers

Country	Earnings	Getting gigs	Getting incentives (eg - insurance, bonus, etc)	ID/Account is blocked	Termination	No influence	Other
Food Delivery							
Bangladesh	18%	45%	4%	0%	0%	43%	9%
India	19%	64%	19%	21%	13%	24%	1%
Indonesia	63%	14%	18%	10%	11%	9%	1%
Nepal	30%	42%	8%	9%	7%	45%	1%
The Philippines	27%	42%	24%	6%	3%	26%	5%
Food delivery - total	32%	41%	14%	9%	7%	29%	4%
Ride sharing							
Bangladesh	39%	76%	4%	8%	0%	17%	3%
India	30%	81%	14%	15%	1%	11%	1%
Indonesia	56%	20%	18%	23%	15%	15%	0%
Nepal	54%	79%	5%	20%	12%	16%	0%
The Philippines	26%	54%	20%	12%	11%	31%	0%
Ride sharing - total	41%	60%	13%	16%	8%	18%	1%
Home services							
Bangladesh	37%	45%	2%	2%	0%	27%	8%
India	35%	82%	24%	59%	43%	2%	6%
Indonesia	48%	4%	0%	0%	0%	48%	4%
Nepal	14%	6%	0%	2%	0%	84%	0%
The Philippines	19%	46%	0%	0%	0%	49%	3%
Home services - total	30%	40%	6%	15%	10%	41%	4%
TOTAL	35%	49%	12%	13%	8%	27%	2%

Working conditions

- **Remuneration, volatile earnings, incentives, and onboarding fees**

Table G: Overview of the basis for incentives received by workers across sectors and countries

Country	Working on particular hours or particular shifts	Completing more number of tasks	Extending working hours	Other
Food delivery				
Bangladesh	45%	55%	0%	23%
India	62%	83%	6%	2%
Indonesia	10%	92%	11%	2%
Nepal	33%	71%	26%	6%
The Philippines	38%	64%	11%	0%
Food delivery - total	37%	75%	12%	4%
Ride sharing				
Bangladesh	26%	57%	0%	13%
India	38%	79%	3%	8%
Indonesia	14%	91%	17%	0%
Nepal	44%	70%	21%	5%
The Philippines	32%	76%	8%	1%
Ride sharing - total	31%	78%	11%	4%
Home services				
Bangladesh	15%	35%	4%	42%
India	47%	33%	11%	36%
Indonesia	11%	61%	11%	22%
Nepal	50%	39%	43%	14%
The Philippines	86%	14%	7%	0%
Home services - total	40%	37%	17%	26%
TOTAL	35%	70%	12%	8%

Table H: Overview of types of hiring and onboarding costs across sectors and countries

Country	Registration/ onboarding fee	Any fee given to recruiter	Fee/charges for uniforms, bags, equipment, products for beauty services, etc	Fee for receiving training	Fee/ loan for vehicle	Police verification fees	Other fee	No fee
Food Delivery								
Bangladesh	0%	0%	26%	0%	0%	0%	0%	74%
India	49%	3%	77%	1%	0%	0%	4%	6%
Indonesia	6%	1%	78%	0%	0%	9%	1%	19%
Nepal	7%	3%	43%	0%	1%	16%	0%	31%
The Philip- pines	3%	0%	48%	2%	0%	32%	0%	48%
Food delivery - total	13%	1%	55%	1%	0%	11%	1%	35%
Ride sharing								
Bangladesh	0%	1%	5%	0%	0%	0%	0%	93%
India	16%	0%	1%	0%	1%	0%	1%	80%
Indonesia	3%	1%	48%	1%	1%	18%	4%	44%
Nepal	21%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	78%
The Philip- pines	12%	2%	23%	0%	0%	22%	1%	56%
Ridesharing – total	10%	1%	17%	0%	0%	9%	1%	68%
Home services								
Bangladesh	16%	2%	4%	0%	0%	0%	2%	76%
India	51%	0%	82%	53%	0%	6%	2%	4%
Indonesia	30%	4%	70%	0%	0%	7%	4%	15%
Nepal	62%	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	38%
The Philip- pines	3%	0%	14%	8%	0%	11%	3%	70%
Home services - total	34%	1%	31%	14%	0%	4%	2%	42%
TOTAL	16%	1%	34%	3%	0%	9%	1%	51%

- **Working hours and unstable schedules**

Table I: Hours workers by platform workers across sectors and countries

Country	4 hours or less	More than 4 hours, less than or equal to 8 hours	More than 8 hours, less than or equal to 12 hours	More than 12 hours
Food delivery				
Bangladesh	0%	24%	71%	5%
India	6%	20%	50%	24%
Indonesia	4%	20%	52%	24%
Nepal	5%	69%	24%	1%
The Philippines	0%	34%	60%	6%
Food delivery - total	3%	33%	51%	12%
Ride sharing				
Bangladesh	1%	20%	61%	18%
India	6%	10%	46%	38%
Indonesia	4%	22%	48%	26%
Nepal	3%	37%	45%	16%
The Philippines	1%	26%	54%	19%
Ride sharing - total	3%	23%	51%	23%
Home services				
Bangladesh	29%	39%	29%	2%
India	2%	22%	73%	4%
Indonesia	33%	59%	7%	0%
Nepal	16%	56%	28%	0%
The Philippines	32%	62%	3%	3%
Home services - total	21%	45%	32%	2%
TOTAL	7%	31%	47%	15%

- Platform performance metrics

Table J: Overview of platform-based guidelines for workers

Country	Work for a certain numbers of hours	Complete a designated number of tasks	Log in and log out everyday	Stay active on the app for certain hours	Maintain minimum balance in the account	Not cancelling certain number of gigs consecutively	No particular guidelines	Other
Food Delivery								
Bangladesh	4%	1%	4%	3%	4%	7%	68%	14%
India	16%	29%	13%	10%	3%	50%	31%	7%
Indonesia	23%	43%	15%	15%	8%	82%	6%	0%
Nepal	50%	46%	36%	45%	18%	43%	16%	0%
The Philip-pines	35%	37%	35%	35%	11%	50%	10%	2%
Food delivery - total	25%	31%	20%	21%	9%	47%	27%	5%
Ride sharing								
Bangladesh	0%	3%	14%	4%	7%	13%	67%	8%
India	9%	13%	14%	5%	13%	28%	40%	5%
Indonesia	16%	35%	9%	10%	11%	69%	8%	1%
Nepal	21%	34%	9%	16%	43%	47%	25%	0%
The Philip-pines	9%	30%	24%	30%	13%	39%	20%	1%
Ride sharing – total	11%	24%	14%	14%	17%	40%	30%	3%
Home services								
Bangladesh	4%	6%	8%	0%	4%	0%	75%	6%
India	41%	31%	33%	35%	24%	73%	8%	18%
Indonesia	0%	7%	7%	4%	4%	22%	63%	0%
Nepal	46%	54%	0%	0%	0%	0%	83%	0%
The Philip-pines	27%	27%	0%	3%	14%	8%	57%	8%
Home services - total	23%	23%	11%	9%	9%	21%	50%	7%
TOTAL	19%	26%	16%	15%	12%	38%	33%	4%

Extreme weather impacts on platform workers

Table K: Top weather events affecting platform workers across countries

Country	Excess rains	Floods	Cyclones/ typhoons	Increasing heat	Heatwaves	Increasing cold	Thunderstorms	Air pollution
Extreme Weather events								
Bangladesh	60%	2%	2%	29%	30%	14%	2%	3%
India	69%	8%	0%	43%	14%	5%	1%	10%
Indonesia	71%	62%	14%	36%	6%	5%	19%	22%
Nepal	79%	38%	5%	59%	1%	59%	5%	60%
The Philippines	79%	85%	79%	47%	16%	1%	3%	4%
Combined Total – All countries	71%	39%	20%	43%	13%	17%	6%	20%







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